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1. SUMMARY: by a state court of class 
action procedures on arbitrations covered by the Federal Arbitration ----Act ("FAA") violates the Supremacy Clause; whether a state statute, 
permitting litigation of certain claims made arbitrable by a contract 
covered by the FAA, violates the Supremacy Clause. Whether, under the 




2. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW: Southland Corporation is 
the owner of the service trademark "7-Eleven," and franchises 7-Eleven 
convenience stores. Southland's standard 7-Eleven franchise agreement 
provides each franchisee with license to use certain trademarks, a 
lease or sublease of certain stores, the financing of store 
inventories, and advertising and merchandizing assistance. The 
franchisees in return operate the stores and provide Southland with a 
percentage of gross profits. Each agreement contains an arbitration 
clause providing that: 
"[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to 
this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association •.• and judgment upon any award 
rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court 
having jurisdiction thereof." J.S. App. 3a. 
Between 1975 and 1977, several franchisees--appees here--filed 
individual actions against Southland in state court alleging among 
other things fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of contract, breach 
of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclosure requirements of the 
Franchise Investment Law, Cal. Corp. Code §31000 et seq. Southland 
filed an answer including the defense of failure to arbitrate. In - -------------- -
1977, another franchisee--also an appee here--filed a class action 
against Southland on behalf of an asserted class of approximately 800 
Southland franchisees in California, asserting claims similar to those 
in the other actions. Southland~etitioned to compel arbitration in 
all pending cases. Shortly thereafter, all the cases were 
consolidated. 
Except for the claims based on the Franchise Investment Law, the 
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TC granted Southland's motions to compel arbitration. Southland 
appealed from the order insofar as it excluded the claims based on the 
California statute. The franchisees appealed from the order insofar 
as it compelled arbitration of the rest of their claims. The 
franchisees also objected to the TC's failure to rule on the class 
certification motion before ordering arbitration. 
3. DECISION BELOW: At the outset, the~l. S. Ct. observed that 
the contracts at issue involve interstate commerce and thus fall 
within the ambit of thev;ederal Arbitration Act, 9 u.s.c. §§ 1, et 
seq. Section 2 of the Act, central to the dispute here, provides: 
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a A A .~ 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to ~ 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out ~ L-
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform ~ 
the whole ~r any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to 
submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, 
irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract." 
Appees contended that the contracts were void as contracts of 
/1 adhesion. The Cal. s. Ct. agreed that the contracts were adhesive . 
• ~ 
But one of two further factors are required to render a contract of 
adhesion unenforceable under California law: that the challenged 
provision does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the , 
weaker party~ or that--even if within the weaker party's expectation--
the provision is unduly oppressive. The court stated that arbitration 
in the context of contracts ~f adhesion is problematic, because 
susceptible of being structured or used to unfair advantage. But 
~ arbitration can be a good thing, speeding resolution of disputes at 
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less cost to the adversaries. For that reason, an arbitration clause 
is not oppressive. Further, arbitration clearly was within the 
contemplation of the franchisees. Thus, in general, 
clauses were valid and en~orc~ under state law. ~~# 'l -
- - s ~~~ The court turned to the ~ ranchise Investment Law . claims, 1 lairns 
that Southland willfully made false s~~e.;~n~~~iled to make 
required statements of fact. One pro~sion of the state statute 
states that "Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 1 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance with any 
provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." The 
~ 
state supreme court found that t his provi~ion barred arbitration of 
alleged violations of the statute, which required a judicial forum. ~ 
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Wilko v. Swan,~ 
346 u.s. 427 (1953). In Wilko, this Court held that similar language 
in section 14 of the Securities ~ct of 1933 (15 u.s.c. §77n) permits 
suit by a customer against a brokerage firm for alleged 
misrepresentation in sale of securities, notwithstanding a provision 
for arbitration contained in the agreement. The arbitration clause 
was a "stipulation" and the right to select the judicial forum in 
which to bring the claim the kind of "provision" that could not be 
waived in advance. The effectiveness of the securities statute would 
be lessened by requiring arbitration, in part because of the limited 
nature of judicial review. Thus the Court concluded, "Congress must 
have intended [the waiver provision] to apply to waiver of judicial 
trial and review." 346 u.s., at 437. The California legislature 
modeled the Franchise Investment Law on the Securities Act. They have 
_/ the same purposes--protecting investors through preinvestment 
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disclosure--and their operative provisions often employ the same 
language. Thus, the California legislature intended, as Congress did 
in the Securities Act, that the nonwaiver provision prevent compelled 
arbitration of claims made under the Law. 
The next question was whether the Federal Arbitration ~ct ~ JY -
pr~d the Law, so construed. Appnts argued that the FAA, in  
mandating that an arbitration provision be "valid, irrevocable, and 
enforceable," establishes a general principle of arbitrability that 
preempts any state law or policy restrictive of arbitration. The 
court termed this position "overly broad." In Prima Paint v. Flood & 
Conklin, 388 u.s. 395 (1967}, this Court held that a claim of fraud in 
the inducement of the contract (as distinguished from a claim of fraud 
in the inducement of the arbitrability clause} is a question for the 
arbitrator, not the court, and that this rule applies whatever the 
rule under state law. But Prima Paint dealt exclusively with the rule 
to be applied by federal courts sitting in diversity. It left open 
the question whether the FAA applies to state courts at all. Since 
that time, however, virtually every court has concluded that the FA~ 
creates "substantive federal law" that must be applied, regardless of 
forum, wherever federal jurisdiction exists (and by this is meant 
wherever a contract is in interstate commerce} • The question was thus 
whether the FAA's substantive law--requiring that arbitration clauses 
be enforced--precludes a State from providing unwaivable access to 
court for franchise investors. The California court recognized that 
some courts had answered that question in the affirmative. Allison v. 
Medicab Intern., Inc., 597 P.2d 380, 383 (Wash. 1979}~ Barron v. 
~ Tastee Freez Intern., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1213 (E.D. Wis. 1980}. But 
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the court "respectfully disagree[d]." J.S. App. 15a. 
The coutr granted hat the FAA generally requires that interstate 
contracts should be free from judicial hostility to arbitration. But 
this spirit can be harmonized with the California law. California too 
encourages arbitration as a matter of state policy. But California 
has a countervailing policy that recognizes that in some circumstances 
the public interest is best served by guaranteeing access to a 
judicial forum. Congress has not sought to preempt the field of 
regulating franchise relationships. So there is no reason to believe 
that Congress would preclude this type of regulation. The court cited 
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973), 
for the proposition that state laws must be harmonized with federal 
law unless Congress has made its intention to preempt the field very 
clear. The court also cited Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 710 
(1962), on the dangers of reading statutes too literally. The federal 
principles favoring arbitration are not so rigid as to preclude this 
sort of specific state nonwaiver law. 
Appees argued that if the remaining issues were to proceed in 
arbitration, then the class should first be certified by the TC so 
that the arbitration could proceed as a class action. The court 
assumed without deciding that the cases were susceptible to treatment 
as a class action, stating that this question would be decided on 
remand by the TC. Without discussing the possible impact of the FAA, 
the court then balanced the California policies favoring unencumbered 
arbitration and favoring class actions. It decided that in the 
context of contracts of adhesion, class-wide arbitration was 
appropriate. Certainly this ruling will involve the courts in 
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arbitration more than individual arbitration would: the supervising 
court would have to make the initial determinations regarding class 
certification and notice to class members: and as arbitration 
proceeds, the court might have to "exercise a measure of external 
supervision" to protect absent class members. But the interests 
served by class actions justified the encumbrance. 
The court remanded to the trial court for a determination whether j 
the arbitrable claims could proceed on a class-wide basis and if so to ~· 
draw up the guidelines for this process It also remanded for a trial 
on the Franchise Investment Law claims. 
Justice Richardson concurred in the determination that the 
arbitration clause is enforceable. He dissented from the holding that 
the Franchise Investment Law claims are not subject to arbitration and 
from the finding that class action arbitration is an available remedy. 
Wilko is irrelevant to this case because it dealt with balancing two 
federal statutes. Here preemption is at issue, a conflict of a 
federal and a state statute. ~he great majority of lower courts hold 
that the FAA creates federal substantive law applicable in both 
federal and state courts. It is irrelevant that Congress has not 
preempted the field of franchise regulation. The point is that 
congress has preempted the field "of arbitration as applied to~ 
contract in interstate commerce." The dissent relied in part on cases 
from other States holding that their franchise protection statutes 
were preempted by the FAA insofar as they would invalidate arbitration 
clauses. 
The dissent also took issue with the determination that class 
_/ arbitration was a proper procedure. Also relying exclusively on state 
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law, the dissent found that class action procedures would involve the 
judiciary too much in the arbitration process. 
4. CONTENTIONS: Jurisdictional Issues: Appees argue that the 
Court lacks jurisdiction over the class arbitration claims. First, 
say appees, appnts never argued that the FAA prohibited class 
arbitration in the courts below. Throughout they argued that class 
arbitration was inconsistent with state law. Second, there is not a 
final judgment with respect to the class arbitration issue. ~he court 
merely assumed that the cases could be maintained as class actions, 
but left that question to the trial court on remand. The only 
possible applicable exception to the rule of Cox Broadcasting Corp v. 
Cohn, 420 u.s. 469 (1975), is the fourth one enumerated there: tf the 
federal issue has been finally decided and reversal on the federal 
issue "will be preclusive of any further litigation on the relevant 
cause of action rather than merely controlling the nature and 
character of .•. the state proceedings still to come," id., at 483, 
and if the state decision might "seriously erode" federal policy, the 
final judgment requirement is satisfied. Here, the state decision 
merely sanctions a certain procedure in a continuing litigation and is 
; , 
thus clearly outside the exception. 
Appnts reply that they did raise the argument that the FAA 
preempts class arbitration. In their petn for hearing in that court, 
they raised the FAA as a bar to class action arbitration. They argued 
that this procedure was improper under "federal and California law." 
They cited many federal cases. The final judgment rule is also 
satisfied, they say. It is true that the dispute between the parties 
- has not been finally resolved, but the fourth exception of Cox 
- 9 -
applies. The federal issue--whether class arbitration is consistent 
with the FAA--has been finally decided. Reversal would preclude 
"further judicial litigation" of the parties' dispute, since the 
parties would immediately proceed to individual arbitration, and there 
would be no need for continuing judicial supervision. And the 
decision of the court below will seriously erode the federal policy 
favoring arbitration. As in Mercantile National Bank v. Langdeau, 371 
u.s. 555 (1963), it serves the policies underlying the final judgment 
rule "to determine now in which [forum] appellants may [proceed] 
rather than to subject them .•. to long and complex litigation which 
may be for naught if consideration of the preliminary question .•. is 
postponed until the conclusion of the proceedings." 
The Merits: Appnts argue that the decision below seeks to 
establish that ~tate legislatures have the right to single out certain 
areas of commerce that shall be exempt from the requirement of the 
FAA. This is in conflict with the decisions of several courts and 
clear federal policy. Second, the class arbitration decision is 
unprecedented and potentially destructive of the values the FAA sought 
to advance. 
With respect to class arbitration, appnts argue that the success 
of arbitration depends on freedom from strict judicial rules and 
supervision. Often arbitrators chosen by the parties will not be 
attorneys and will be unfamiliar with the complex rules due process 
would require for the protection of absent class members. Moreover, 
the process--desirable mostly for its speedy resolution of disputes--
will be greatly slowed by requiring recourse to the court at various 
~ junctures. Class action will increase the cost of arbitration--
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perhaps even above the cost of litigation itself. At the conclusion 
of the class arbitration, individual arbitrations on damages and other 
special issues would ensue. Moreover, decertification, which like 
certification would be done by the court, is always a possibility. 
All of this is inconsistent with the FAA and the parties agreement to 
arbitrate on an individual basis according to the rules of the 
American Arbitration Association. In fact, single arbitrations will 
be more efficient, for a number of reasons. But even if class 
arbitration were more efficient, the FAA requires that the agreement 
of the parties control. They chose individual arbitration. See 
Dickinson v. Heinold Securities, Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 646 (CA7 1981). 
Respecting the Franchise Investment Law, appnts argue that the 
FAA clearly requires valid arbitration clauses to govern. Wilko is 
irrelevant because it deals with two federal statutes. Other courts 
have so held. Ware is irrelevant because the Court there found that 
there was no conflict between the federal statute and the state one. 
This case presents a direct federal-state conflict. Because the 
California law stands as a clear impediment to realization of the 
goals of the federal statute, it must fall. States cannot create 
"exceptions" to a federal statute. 
Appees move to dismiss on the jurisdictional grounds mentioned 
above and on the ground that there is no substantial federal question. 
Respecting the class arbitration, appees urge that the FAA is purely 
substantive, requiring arbitration, but leaves to the States the 
procedures to be followed in arbitrations. The class arbitration 
issue, therefore, is purely a question of state law. Second, 
respecting the California statute, the court below relied on Wilko 
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only as an aid to interpreting the Californi~ act, which was based on 
the Securities Act. Certain state courts have held that state 
antitrust and state securities laws override arbitration agreements on 
the ground that the federal courts have construed the corresponding 
federal acts to foreclose arbitration clauses. These state courts 
have balanced their state policies against the federal policy in 
arbitrating. 
Finally, appees argue that ware supports the decision below. In 
Ware, the Court considered an alleged conflict bewteen arbitration 
mandated by the New York Stock Exchange under the self-governing 
provisions of the Securities Exchange Act, and the California Labor 
Code, which required a judicial forum. The stock exchange rules did 
not preempt the state law because California manifested a strong 
public policy favoring providing its wage earners a judicial forum for 
wage disputes. Southland incorrectly asserts that Ware does not apply 
because the FAA itself, 9 u.s.c. § 1, exempts contracts of employment. 
But CAs have held that this section does not include account 
executives and that the exception is limited to employees engaged in 
the actual movement of interstate goods. Thus, ware's silence on the 
FAA can be attributed only to an implicit holding that States can 
ensure that state statutes are enforceable in a court, notwithstanding 
the provisions of the FAA. 
5. DISCUSSION: Respecting the Franchise Investment Law, this 
case appears to be in ~rect conflict :ith Allison v. Medicab 
International, Inc., 597 P.2d, at 383 (S. Ct. Wash.). The court there 
held: 
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"that the supremacy clause of the federal constitution must 
prevail and thus the federal arbitration act requires 
enforcement of the arbitration clause in the franchise 
agreement despite the judicial remedies afforded by the 
Franchise Investment Protection ~ct." 
The Wisconsin franchise investment law has also been held preempted by ~ 
the FAA to the extent it required a judicial forum despite an ~ 
arbitration clause. Several other States appear to have similar laws. 
Thus, the issue presented is one of some importa~ce on which there is 
-= 
a direct conflict. The issue subsumes the question whether the FAA 
imposes a limit on state courts. This Court has never decided this 
question, although most state courts apparently agree with the 
California S. Ct. that the statute is of general applicability. ~ppee 
has raised this argument as an alternative ground supporting the 
judgment below, and thus the court will likely be called upon to 
answer it as well, if it notes probable jurisdiction. It is true that 
this issue has been remanded for trial. But it appears to fit within 
the fourth Cox exception: if this Court reverses on the federal 
question--finding the state law preempted by the FAA--the case will go 
directly to arbitration, effectively terminating judicial proceedings. 
Appees do not contest jurisdiction on this issue. Because the 
question presented appears to raise significant preemption issues, and 
because appnts invoke this Court's mandatory jurisdiction, this may be 
an appropriate issue on which to note probable jurisdiction. 
Respecting the "class arbitration" issue, appees raise serious 
jurisdictional questions. It may be, however, that this decision is 
final as well, since reversal on the federal question would send the 
case directly to arbitration, avoiding the trial court's decision 
whether to certify the class and its ensuing supervision of the 
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arbitration. It is strictly true that only the procedures governing 
future litigation are at issue. But the procedures are the essence of 
the federal right asserted. If appnts are forced to arbitrate via the 
class action, their federal right--at least as they see it--to 
individual arbitration pursuant to its contracts is lost, or at least 
delayed. The policies of Langdeau are implicated. It is equally true 
that if the TC decides not to certify a class, the parties will 
proceed to individual arbitration anyway, and there will be no adverse 
consequences to federal policy. But the fourth Cox exception 
explicitly contemplates that a victory on a state law ground by the 
appellant may moot the federal issue. See 420 u.s., at 482-483. 
This question seems to me a close one under the final judgment 
doctrine. It also may be somewhat close as to whether the federal 
question was properly raised below. Appnts apparently did phrase the 
question presented in terms of federal law and certainly did cite a 
number of federal cases in making their argument. But they apparently 
made policy arguments, not preemption arguments, which would suggest a 
state law disposition. Their brief is not included in the papers, so 
this issue cannot be satisfactorily assessed at 
On the merits, th~lass arbitration issue 
~--------..__.. __ _ this time. probably would not 
merit a grant of certiorari on its own. (It is within the Court's 
-appellate jurisdiction only because the other question brings the 
entire case within appellate jurisdiction.) There is no conflict and 
the fact that the trial court has not yet devised the procedures to be 
applied may make this a difficult issue to assess. Still, the State 
is unquestionably defeating the operation of the arbitration clause in 
the individual contracts. Arguably, this violates the FAA, which--as 
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the Cal. s. Ct. granted--requires that these arbitration clauses be 
enforceable. No other court has ever attempted to engraft class 
action rules on arbitration, and as the dissent below stated, class 
action procedures may be inconsistent with the fundamental concept of 
arbitration. If the statutory question is reviewed--and if the 
federal objection to the decision below was properly raised--the Court 
should review this one as well. 
6. RECOMMENDATION: The statutory issue presents a substantial 
federal question. The class arbitration issue should be decided if 
the statutory one is. There are serious jurisdictional questions, 
however. Consequently, I recommend postponing jurisdiction. 
~ 
There is a motion to dismiss and an opposition to that motion. 
December 9, 1982 Ogden opn in appendix 
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The Southland Corp., et al. v. Keating, et al. 
Robert M. Couch July 27, 1983 
Questions Presented (A-1 1 •/.J)I\ 
~~~~~4.~~
(1) Whether the Court has jurisdiction over the 
arbitrability/preemption issue. ~ 
(2) Whether the the Court has jurisdiction over the class-
wide arbitration issue. 'f ~~-J-. 
(3) Whether the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempts 
afotate law that invalidates mandatory arbitration clauses in 
franchise agreements. ~ 
(4) Whether a judicially imposed class-wide arbitration 
arrangement violates the FAA. J~ ~1-~ ~ 
tl..-t- . :J 1/l-t.-~A:-4'~  4 
~t-41>~ .to co~ sfcr 
bench memo: Southland Corp. v. Keating 








2. class-wide proceedings 
3. finality 
B. Preemption 
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I • BACKGROUND 
A. Statutes 
The only jurisdictional statute at issue here is 28 u.s.c. 
§1257 (1976) which gives the Supreme Court jurisdiction over 
cases appealed from a state's highest court "where is drawn in 
question the validity of a statute of any state on the ground of 
its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties or laws of the 
United States, and the decision is in favor of its validity." 
The Cal. S. Ct. relied on the following provision of the Cal. 
Franchise Investment Law: ( C T- J L) 
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive com-
pliance with any provision of this law or any rule or 
order hereunder is void." Cal. Corp. Code §31512 (West 
1977) • 
The appnt contends that this provision of the Cal. Code is 
preempted by the following provision of the Federal Arbitration 
Act (FAA) through the Supremacy Clause: 
"A written provision in a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration 
a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract 
or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or 
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit 
to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction or refusal, shall be val- \ 
id, irrevocable, and enforceable, sav~h 
grounds a~ ex1st at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract." 9 U.S.C. §2 (1976). 
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B. Facts 
The appnt, Southland, is the franchisor of 7-Eleven stores. 
Beginning in May 1977, several of Southland's franchisees filed a 
series of suits in Cal. court against the company alleging, inter 
alia, common law fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary 
duty, and violation of the Cal. Franchise Investment Law (CFIL). 
The alleged violations of CFIL included willful misstatement and 
omission of material facts in statements required to be filed 
under CFIL. Some of the plaintiffs represented a class of all 
current and former 7-Eleven franchisees in Cal. 
In each of the cases Southland moved that the parties be 
compelled to arbitrate. In making its motions, Southland relied 
on a clause in the franchise agreements that provides: 
"[a]ny controversy or claim ar1s1ng out of or relating 
to this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be set-
tled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the 
American Arbitration Association .•• and judgment upon 
any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in 
any court having jurisdiction thereof." J.S. App. 3a 
Soon after Southland made its motions, the Cal. Judicial Council 
consolidated all of the cases. 
In the consolidated case the TC granted Southland's motion 
to compel arbitration with respect to all claims except those 
based on the CFIL. Southland appealed the TC's exclusion of the 
CFIL issues from its order compelling arbitration. The franchi-
sees also appealed from the order, claiming that none of the 
·. 
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claims deserved arbitration and seeking a writ of prohibition or 
mandamus to compel class-wide arbitration. 
C. Decisions Below 
The Cal. Ct. of App. agreed with Southland on the 
arbitrability issue. The court held that the terms of the arbi-
tration clauses of the franchise agreements require arbitration 
of all claims, including those based on CFIL. J.S. App., at 65a. 
----------------------------More importantly, the court found that CFIL does not operate to 
invalidate arbitration clauses that relate to CFIL claims. The 
court reasoned that if CFIL were read as invalidating such 
clauses, it would run afoul of §2 of the RAA. J.S. App., at 66a-
70a. The court also held that the TC was correct in requiring 
the franchisees to submit their other claims to arbitration as a 
class. The court of appeals saw "no insurmountable obstacle to 
\ 
conducting an arbitration on a class-wide basis." The court 
issued a writ of mandate instructing the TC to proceed with the 
class certification process. J.S. App., at 63a. The court also 
ruled on several other issues raised by the parties, none of 
which pertain to this appea1. 1 
The~al. S. Ct. reversed the Ct. App. on the issue of wheth-'------ _________ __.... 
er the CFIL claims were arbitrable. The S. Ct. relied on a pro-
1other issues raised in the Cal. Ct. App. include: (1) whether 
the TC erred in denying the franchises request for a hearing on 
the validity of the arbitration provision; and (2) whether 
Southland waived its right to compel arbitration. 
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vision of CFIL that voids any provision of an agreement that re-
quires a franchisee to waive compliance with any provision of 
CFIL. See Cal. Corp. Code §31512 (West 1977). The court drew an 
analogy between this provision and that involved in Wilko v. 
Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). In Wilko, the Court had to determine 
whether §14 of the Securities Act of 1933 invalidated a provi-
sion in an agreement between a brokerage firm and one of its cus-
tomers that required arbitration of any controversy. Section 14 
provides: "Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any 
person acquiring any security to waive compliance with any provi-
sion of this subchapter or of the rules and regulations of the 
Commission shall be void." 15 u.s .c. §77n (1976) • The Court 
construed the agreement to arbitrate as a stipulation that waived 
the plaintiffs right to select a judicial forum under §22(a) of 
the Securities Act. 346 U.S., at 434-35. Thus, the desire of 
Congress to give investors judicially enforceable protections 
overrode the legislative support for arbitration as set out in 
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. 
The Cal. S. Ct. found that the California legislature had 
used the Securities Act of 1933 as a model when it drafted CFIL. 
The primary purpose of both statutes was to protect investors. 
The court reasoned that since the wording of Cal. Corp. Code 
§31512 and §14 of the Securities Act is similar, the Cal. legis-
lature intended that §31512 be given the same construction that 
the Court gave §14 in Wilko. 
The court then addressed the question _ff whether the FAA 
preempts §31512. In particular, the court was concerned with §2 
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of the FAA, which provides that arbitration clauses of contracts 
"shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any 
contract." 9 U.S.C. §2 (1976). The court stated that the start-
ing point for its analysis 
/ . 
must be Pr1ma Paint v. Flood & {~ 
Conklin, 388 U.S. 395 (1967). In Prima Paint, the Court held fJ~ 
that once a contract was shown to be within the coverage of the 
FAA, a federal court can only entertain a claim that the arbitra-
tion portion of the contract was fraudulently induced, while a 
claim that the contract as a whole was fraudulently induced must 
be decided by an arbitrator. Id., at 403-04. Prima Painti in-
/ 
volved a federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction. The 
Ca. S. Ct. maintained that Prima Paint/ left open the question 
I 
"whether or under what circumstances state courts are constitu-
tionally obligated to apply the substantive principles inherent 
in the federal statute." J.S. App., at 14a. (emphasis in origi-
nal) The court found that the federal substantive law would not 
control in a state case such as this because its application 
would frustrate a clear legislative policy in Cal. to leave en-
forcement of the franchise laws to the judiciary. 
have 
arbitration 
Ct. affirmed the Ct. App.'s holding that the TC -considered the franchisee's request for class-wide 
(..c. ~~d~~~\ 
of the non-CFIL claims. t:j The court reasonecr-t'ha? 
" were several practical reasons for considering a class-wide 
~pproach ._ ~t, if a class action could be avoided by the in-
tV ~'arbitration clause in a contract, all adhesion con-
~ts would contain such a clause. Second, because the princi-
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ples of res judicata and collateral estoppel do not apply in ar-
bitration proceedings, class-wide arbitration would avoid need-
less duplication and the potential for inconsistent awards. Fi-
~----------~'---~--------------,------------------------------nally, the court stated that the controversies that may arise out 
of widely used adhesion contracts present the sort of uniform 
issues and similarly situated parties that are ideal for class 
litigation. The court also found precedent for class-wide arbi-
~ 
tration in state and federal cases that have allowed the consoli-
dation of similar arbitration proceedings. In short, the court ~ 
held that class-wide arbitration proceedings 'h 'd ~ m1g t prov1 e a .1-r:J / G 
"better, more efficient, and fairer solution" than individual 
proceedings, but that the TC must make that determination on re---- .... _......-
2 mand. J.S. App., at 29a. 
Justice Richardson, joined by Justice Mosk, dissented from 
S. Ct.'s holding that the CFIL claims were not arbitra-
He reasoned that the FAA creates a body of national sub-
law that is applicable in state courts, citing Robert 
Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 271 F. 2d 402, 406 (2d Cir. 
1959), cert. dismissed, 364 U.S. 801 (1960). As such, §2 of the 
FAA preempts conflicting Cal. law regardless of the intent of the 
Cal. legislature. Justice Richardson also disagreed with the 
2The Cal. S. Ct. also adressed the TC's denial of the 
franchisees request for a hearing on the issue of whether the 
arbitration clause was invalid as part of a contract of adhesion. 
The court stated that the contract was adhesive, but that it was 
not oppressive. Thus, the arbitration clause was valid and 
enforceable. In addition, the court also found taht the TC had 
not erred in its holding that Couthland had not waived its right 
to compel arbitration. 
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majority's holding on the class-wide arbitration issue. 
1
He stat-
ed that injection of class action procedures, in the absence of 
--------
statutory authority or an express agreement between the parties, 
was "fundamentally contrary to the purpose of arbitraation and to 
the public policy encouraging arbitration." J .s. App., at 44a. 




u/JZ ,, f? ~~ \\ 
The Court has reserved judgment on the question of jurisdic-
tion pending the hearing on the merits. Thus, the jurisdictional 
posture of the case remains in controversy. The franchisees con-
lf1A...-
tend that the Court has no jurisQiqt~ over either the 
arbitrability issue or the suitability of class-wide proceedings. 
1. Arbitrability 
With regard to arbi trabi li ty, the franchisees contend that 
the arbitration clause in the franchise agreements, by its terms, 
does not apply to claims under CFIL. According to the franchi-
sees, courts normally will not construe arbitration clauses as 
requiring arbitration of statutory claims absent express inclu-
sion of such claims, citing Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 
405 u.s. 228 (1972) and Leyva v. Certified Growers of Cal., 593 
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ing to the franchisees, the reason for this rule of construction 
is the judicial distrust of the arbitrator's skill in interpret-
ing statutes. The franchisees contend that the contractual pro-
vision at issue here not only contains no indication that the 
parties intended for the clause to cover statutory claims. In 
fact, they argue, i ;k:ontains an indication of contrary intent. 
They point out that the franchise agreement provides that 
"[u]nless prohibited by applicable law, any controversy or claim 
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach hereof 
shall be settled by arbitration •••• " J.S. App. 49a n.2. They 
assert that the reference to "applicable law" is an indication 
that the parties did not intend for statutory claims to be sub-
ject to arbitration. The franchisees maintain that the applica-
ble law in this case is CFIL and its disclosure provisions begin 
to operate before a franchise agreement is executed. Therefore, 
the parties must not have intended the arbitration clause to cov-
er claims under CFIL. Since CFIL claims are not subject to arbi-
tration, there is no conflict between CFIL and the FAA, and no 
Court jurisdiction over the arbitrability issue. 
Southland does not address the franchisees' argument that 
the arbitration clause of the franchise agreement does not cover 
CFIL claims. The failure to confront this argument is under-
standable~ the franchisees did not raise this issue in their Mo-
tion to Dismiss For Lack of Jurisdiction. They raised the issue 
as an attack on the Court' :Jurisdiction for the first time in 
their brief. (Southland has not filed a reply brief.) The reach 
of the arbitration clause did come up as a substantive issue in 
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the TC. The TC construed the franchise agreement as not requir-
ing arbitration of CFIL claims. The Ct. App. disagreed, holding 
that the parties did not need to use language that expressly re-
ferred to claims under state franchise law to include them within 
the arbitration clause. The court stated that the parties' use 
of the phrase "any controversy or claim arising out of or relat-
ing to this Agreement" was a sufficient expression of the par-
ties' intent to include CFIL claims. J. S. App. , at 6 Sa. The 
Cal. s. Ct. had no reason to construe the language of the arbi-
tration clause because it found that CFIL itself precluded arbi-
tration of CFIL claims. 
A line of u.s. s. Ct. cases lends credence to the franchi-
see's argument that the Court has no jurisdiction because the 
arbitration clause does not apply to CFIL claims. In Iowa Beef 
Packers, supra, an employee filed a suit under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (FLSA}, rather than adhere to the arbitration pro-
cedure set out in his union's contract. The Court dismissed 
cert. as improvidently granted because the arbitration clause in 
question covered only disputes involving interpretation of the 
underlying collective- bargaining agreement (cba} and not claims 
based on the FSLA's overtime provisions • 
./ 
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974}, the 
Cout considered an employer's claim that the arbitration clause 
of a cba required an employee to submit his claim of race dis-
crimination in employment to arbitration. The Court held that 
Title VII claims require different treatment than other claims 
brought under provisions of a cba. Union adoption of the cba 
' I 
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does not act as a waiver of an individual's Title VII claim, 
which has an independent basis. Id., at 51. In the collective 
bargaining setting, the "arbitrator is confined to interpretation 
and application of the collective-bargaining agreement." Id., at 
53. 
/ 
In Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, 450 u.s. 728 
(1981), an employer argued that wage claims of individual employ-
ees pursuant to the FSLA were barred by prior submission of the 
claims to arbitration under the provisions of the cba. The Court 
stressed the ~on-waivable nature of the rights and protections 
that the FSLA bestows on individual workers. Id., at 740. The -
Court drew a distinction between collective rights and duties 
that are subject to arbitration procedures under the provisions 
of a cba and statutory rights that are independent of the 
collective- bargaining process. Id., at 745. 
Despite the apparent tendancy of the Court to exclude statu-
tory claims from mandatory arbitration, the franchisee's argument 
that Iowa Beef and its progeny control this case is not compel-
ling. Each of the cases discussed above involved the waiver of 
important statutory rights of individuals in the context of a 
cba. The same concerns do not apply to arbitration clauses that 
------------~--------------~ --~------------------~~ are negotiated on an individual basis and which do not seek 
............--- ....._. ~- _..---.-.....--------
t f ai ve important statutory rights, even though the underlying 
contract is adhesive. Likewise, a requirement that an arbitra-
tion clause expressly enumerate each legal issue that the parties 
wish to subject to arbitration, rather than using a catch-all 
phrase, would be unworkable. Furthermore, the parties' use of 
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the phrase "unless prohibited by applicable law" should not be 
construed as automatically excluding from the purview of the ar-
bi tration clause any claim that is based on a state or federal 
statute. If that were the case, the Uniform Commercial Code 
would render all similarly worded arbitration clauses virtually 
inoperable. 
2. Class-wide proceedings . 
With respect to the class arbitration issue, the franchisees 
contend that Southland did not present a question of federal law 
in the state courts. The franchisees maintain that Southland ------admitted in the Cal. Ct. App. that the class arbitration issue 
was governed by state law. They argue that the state courts 
decided the issue based on state law and that Southland should 
not be allowed to change the focus of their argument just so it 
can have its case heard by the Court. 
Southland argues that the pleadings it filed with the Cal. S. 
Ct. clearly indicated that it was asserting its rights under both 
federal and state law. Southland points out that it cited over 
sixty federal cases in its brief to the Cal. S. Ct. and that the 
~
court decided the case in the context of the FAA. Thus, accord-
ing to Southland, there is no merit to the franchisee's argument 
that this issue has been raised solely to invoke the jurisdiction 
of the Court. 
The ~anchisees have a valid point. In Webb v. Webb, 451 
u.s. 493 (1981), the Court reiterated the "long-settled rule that 
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CaA.f.sjcr~ 
the jurisdiction of this Court to re-examine the final judgment 
of a state court can arise only if the record as a whole shows 
either expressly or by clear implication that the federal claim 
was adequately presented in the state system." Id., at 496. The 
Court also recognized the presumption that the petr did not 
present the federal issue properly if the highest state court 
failed to pass on the issue. 
......... 
Id., at 495; cf. id., at 502 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring) (presentation to state court unnecessary if 
issue involves fundamental unfairness). The Cal. S. Ct. decided 
the issue of class-wide arbitration as a matter of state law, 
although it relied on federal cases for analogous support. In 
its brief to the Cal. S. Ct., Southland cited numerous federal 
cases, but it distinguished those cases that approved of the con-
solidation of individual arbitration proceedings. Southland main-
tained that Cal., and not federal, procedures should control. 
Petition for Hearing in the Cal. s. Ct., at 24-25. Southland did 
state in its petition to the Cal. s. Ct. that its case was gov-
erned by the FAA, but it did not argue that the FAA should affect 
the court's decision on the class arbitration issue. Id., at 2, 
6 n.6. The Court's jurisdiction should not rest on such passing 
references to federal law. Unless this is the sort of manifest 
unfairness to which you referred in your concurrence in Webb, I 
do not think the Court has jurisdiction over the arbi trabili ty 
issue. 
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3. Finality 
As an alternative ground for dismissing both issues for lack 
of jurisdiction, the franchisees point out that Southland is not .....,._ 
appealing from a final judgment. They contend that this case 
~------~--~------ --~---
does not fit within any of the recognized exceptions to the final 
judgment rule. They argue that further lower court proceedings 
are likely to occur that may change the issues in this case. 
Furthermore, they maintain that no federal policy will be under-
mined by letting the case run its course. With regard to the 
class-wide arbitration issue, they concede that the matter arose 
on their application for a writ of prohibition, but they contend 
that the Cal. S. Ct.'s jurisdiction was based on the controversy 
as a whole not just the order denying the application. 
Relying on previous u.s. s. Ct. statements that courts 
should take a practical approach to the issue of finality, South-
land urges the Court to consider the appeal of the arbitrability 
issue even though further proceedings in the state courts are 
likely. Southland contends that the Court must weigh "the incon-
venience and costs of piecemeal review on the one y nd and the 
danger of denying justice by delay on the other." Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 417 u.s. 156, 171 (1974). Southland argues 
that this case falls within a well-recognized exception to the 
rule that an appeal will lie only from a final judgment as set 
out in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). 
Under Cox, a non-final state order is nonetheless appealable if: 
the state court has made a final decision regarding a federal 
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issue; reversal of the state court would preclude the need for 
further litigation; and refusal to allow the appeal might result 
in erosion of federal policy. Southland contends that all of 
these conditions are met here. This conclusion, according to 
Southland, is reinforced by the fact that failure to review the 
state court at this stage effectively may preclude any review of 
the federal issue, citing Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan 
Corp., 337 U.s. 541, 546 (1949) • 
Southland also argues that the class action issue has met 
the finality requirements. Southland points out that this issue 
was raised and decided through a writ of prohibition. Southland 
contends that final disposition of such a writ satisfies the fi-
nal judgment rule. In the alternative, Southland argues that 
this issue also falls within the Cox and Cohen exceptions. 
The disposition of both issues in the Cal. S. Ct. was suffi-
ciently final to suport the Court's appellate jurisdiction. The 
Ct. App. decided the class-wide arbitration issue on a writ of 
prohibition or mandamus. The Cal. S. Ct.'s final disposition of 
the writ is a final judgment even though the effect of the 
court's decision will be further proceedings in lower state 
courts. Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 u.s. 549, 565 
(1947). Accord Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 385 n.7 
(1976). 
The arbi trabili ty issue falls within the~ox exception to 
the final judgment rule. Consistent with the practical approach 
espoused by the Court in the past, and the need to review the 
Cal. S. Ct. decision in light of the policy behind the FAA, I 
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 ~ktL.~ ~ ~Jj_s. i;;f" 
think that the Court has jurisdiction over this issue. Requ~
the CFIL claims to proceed through judicial channels postpones ~· 
review indefinitely even though final determination of the issue ~ ~ 
by the Court might preclude further proceedings in state cour~~~ 
This seems to be just the sort of case contemplated in Cox. 
B. Preemption 
The question of the effect that the FAA has on §31512 of 
~ _,.. 
CFIL is really one of preemEtion rather than arbitrability. Nei-
--------- ""'"? - ~ 
ther party contests the Cal. S. Ct.'s interpretation of Cal. law, 
I 
i. e., that CFIL renders arbitration clauses, as they pertain to 
CFIL related claim~ void. The controversy revolves around 
whether Congress's expression of favor for- the ~rbitration proc-
../' 
ess in the FAA preempts the Cal. legislature's preference of a 
~judicial forum in franchise cases. 
~ Southland relies heavily on the language of §2 of the FAA. 
5~ ;ection 2 provides that an arbitration agreement "shall be valid, 
~~-~irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contracts." 3 South-
land contends that Congress had two aims in mind when it passed 
the FAA in 1925: to allow parties to avoid the cost and delay of 
litigation; and to overrule anti-arbitration decisions in various 
3section 2 also requires that the contract containing the 
arbitration clayuse involve interstate commerce. Neither petr 
nor resp disputes the interstate character of the franchise 
agreement. 
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jurisdictions. Southland argues that the proviso in § 2 (i. e. , 
"save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the re-
vocation of any contract") only applies to grounds for revocation 
under general principles of contract law such as fraud, duress, 
or lack of legal capacity, citing cases from u.s. Courts of Ap-- -----... ____, ~ 
peals in 6 circuits. Southland also quotes language from Moses 
• 
(..()~~$' H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Construction Corp., 103 S.Ct. 
~27, 941 (~), to the effect that §2 establishes a body of fed-
eral substantive law favoring arbitration agreements that is 
binding on the states. According to Southland, the effect of the 
Cal. S. Ct. decision in this case is to invalidate any arbitra-
tion agreement that conflicts with CFIL regardless of whither the 
agreement is valid under contract law principles. Thus, the Cal. 
statute directly contravenes the provisions of the FAA and must 
be declared invalid under the Supremacy Clause. 
Southland would distinguish those cases relied on by the Cal. 
S. Ct. Southland contends that Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, 
and Smith v. Ware, 414 u.s. 117 (1973), is distinguishable be-
cause the state and federal statutes at issue in that case did 
not conflict. Southland also argues that the court's reliance on 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), is misplaced because that 
case involved the conflict between the FAA and another federal 
statute, rather than a state statute. Thus, preemption under the 
Supremacy Clause was not an issue in Wilko. 
Southland also makes some policy arguments for reversal of 
the Cal. S. Ct. The rule announced below would undermine the 
uniformity of judicial treatment of arbitration clauses, thereby 
-----~~----~-~----- -------, 
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leading to forum shopping. Another effect of affirmance would be 
to hinder the administration of justice by increasing the number 
of cases that will be litigated rather than arbitrated. Finally, 
Southland notes that Congress reaffirmed its support for arbitra-
tion agreements by expressly providing for arbitration of patent 
disputes in the Patent and Trademark Appropriations Bill for 
1983-1985, 96 Stat. 317 (1982). 
The franchisees contend that Southland's interpretation of 
the FAA would give private parties the power to control the forum 
for enforcement of important statutory rights; a result uncontem-
plated by the drafters of the act. The franchisees remind the 
Court that it has traditionally hesitated to use the Supremacy 
Clause to invalidate a state's exercise of its police power un-
less preemption was a "clear and manifest" purpose in passing the 
conflicting federal legislation. ~ v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 
435 U.S. 151,157 (1978). The franchisees argue that, where pos-
sible, a court should attempt to reconcile conflicting state and 
federal statutes, citing Merrill, Lynch, supra, at 127 and Flori-
da Lime & Avacado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 
(1963). 
The franchisees find a parallel between the statutes at 
issue here and those reconciled in Merrill, Lynch, supra. The 
Court in Merrill, Lynch found that a New York Stock Exchange rule 
requiring arbitration of wage disputes did not preempt a Cal. 
labor statute that exempted such disputes from arbitration. The 
Court held that the stock exchange rule did not fall under the 
Exchange's statutory mandate to protect the investing public and 
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to insure just and equitable trade practices. Id., at 135. 
Therefore, the rule must yield to provisions of state labor laws. 
The franchisees contend that this result compels an affirmance of 
the Cal. S. Ct. in this case. 
The franchisees also rely on the legislative history behind 
the FAA as support for their position. The franchisees argue 
that Congress did not intend to include either state or federal 
)/statutory claims' within the coverage of the FAA. Instead, Con-
~ ------------------------------
gress only intended for the FAA to overcome judicial hostility to 
arbitration. The franchisees would limit the Court's language to 
the contrary in Moses H. Cone Hosp., supra, by distinguishing~ 
that case as involving common law disputes, rather than statutor~ 
ones. They maintain that the limitation is consistent with the~ 
line of cases in which the Court exempted certain statut
~~ 
claims of individuals from arbitration clauses of collecti
bargaining agreements. See ante, at 10-12. 
I 
Another of the franchisee's arguments against preempti~~ 
that the FAA does not apply in this situation. They argue that j.L 'Z.: z 
before the FAA comes into play, there must be a valid arbitratio~ 
clause, referring to the proviso in §2 of the FAA. Relyingon the 
non-waiver provision of CFIL, §31512, the franchisees contend 
that the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement is revoca-
ble under Cal. law. They contend that, because §31512 renders the 
arbitration clause void, the FAA does not apply. (You might call 
this imaginative bootstrapping.) 
Finally, the franchisees present a general argument that the 
Court should avoid construing state statutes in a way that ren-
,, 
... · 
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ders them unconstitutional. The franchisees also question Con-
gress's power to deny access to state courts by compelling arbi-
tration of state created claims that are unarbitrable under state 
law. 
The State of Washington and the North American Securities 
Administrators Association filed an amicus brief. Their brief 
rehashes many of the franchisee's arguments. They seem particu-
larly concerned, however, with the interplay between state secu-
rities laws and state franchise laws. They point out that state 
-------------------------------------franchise laws and state securities laws employ similar language 
and have the same purpose -- the protection of investors. The 
amici argue that since federal courts have held that the federal 
securities laws override the provisions of the FAA, and state 
courts have adopted the same view when construing state securi-
ties laws, the Court should not preempt similarly worded fran-
chise laws. 
When it passed the FAA, Congress intended it as an instruc-
tion to the judiciary to be more receptive to arbitration agree-
ments. Congress probably did not foresee that the FAA would be 
used to limit state statutes. The absence of a clear-cut legis-
lative intent that the FAA be implied in this fashion, coupled 
with the Court's traditional reluctance to find preemption of 
state statutes, provides strong support for the franchisee's po-
sition. Nevertheless, the Court stated last term in Moses H. Cone 
Hosp.: 
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"Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal ~ 
federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, 
notwi thstatnding any state substantive or procedural h-:::2 
policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is --
to create a body of federal substantive law of 
arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration agreement~ 
within the coverage of the Act •••• [Q]uestions of . 
arbi trabili ty must be addressed with a heal thy regard 4 
for the federal policy favoring arbitration. • • • The tJ!! 
Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of feder-~~ 
al law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable 
issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration, ~ 
whether the problem at hand is the construction of the ;=:./;If 
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, 
delay, or a like defense to arbitrability." Moses H. 
Cone Hosp., supra, at 942-943. 
The franchisees try to distinguish Moses H. Cone Hosp. on the 
ground that it involved common law claims and this case involves 
statutory claims. Such a distinction does not make sense, and 
~-----------------------------
has no foundation in the opinion, especially in 1 ight of the 
-------·"'--
broad language used in that case. Although the potential for 
abuse of arbitration clauses, particularly in adhesion contracts, 
is great, I think Moses H. Cone Hosp. requires a reversal of the 
Cal. S. Ct. on this issue. 
c. Class-wide Arbitration 
Southland argues the Cal. S. Ct.'s instruction that the TC 5~1 
should consider a class-wide arbitration violates the spirit of~/T 
the FAA. According to Southland, the reason parties opt for ar-
bitration is its ease, informality, and speed. By ruling that 
arbitration in this case must proceed on a class-wide basis, the 
court appended a time-consuming, costly, complex, and difficult-
to-manage process to one designed for its simplicity. In addi-
tion, a class-wide arbitration requires judicial management at 
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every stage. Southland contends that the FAA allows the parties 
to decide whether to arbitrate and the procedure that should gov-
ern the arbitration, and the court should not disturb these deci-
sions. Finally, Southland argues that the complexities inherent 
in the arbitration process would make it difficult to find 
skilled arbitrators who would be willing to take the case. 
The franchisees assert that class-wide arbitration will be 
7 
less cumbersome than numerous individual cases. They argue that ~ 
the procedure is consistent with the liberal federal policy fa-
vor ing arbitration because the policy reasons that support the 
use of class actions in the normal litigation setting apply 
equally to the arbitration setting. Thus, class-wide arbitration 
does not violate the spirit of the FAA. 
The franchisees also argue that Cal. should have say-so over 
what procedures are proper. Assuming that the substantive as-
pects of §2 of the FAA apply to this case, the procedures that a 
state court should use to implement the FAA are state procedures. 
There is no provision in the FAA that requires substitution of 
federal procedures for state ones, citing Moses H. Cone Memorial 
Hosp., supra, at 942-43 & n.32. Since the Cal. S. Ct. has decid-
ed that class-wide arbitration is an acceptable procedure in 
Cal., the Court should not substitute its opinion on the subject. 
The franchisees 1 brief also addresses many of the concerns 
mentioned in Southland 1 s brief. According to the franchisees, 
judicial participation in the arbitration process is not unusual. 
Courts often order that the consolidation of two or more arbitra-
tions. The Fed. R. Civ. P. authorize motions to compel arbitra-
7 , 
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tion, set out the procedure for pre-arbitration discovery, and 
permit motions to dismiss even though arbitration is taking 
place. The franchisees argue that none of the difficulties an-
ticipated by Southland will actually occur, and if the proceed-
ings do get out of hand, the Cal. courts have the power to de-
clare the arbitration clause in the franchise agreement uncon-
scionable and, thus, invalid. 
The reason that Southland did not dwell on the federal as-
pects of this case in the lower courts (as discussed under 
Jurisdiction above) is that there really are no federal aspects. 
... __. twa~~ ,_,l:w= ..................... -
The FAA is silent on the suitability of arbitration in class ac-
tion situations. There is no case law on the subject. As the 
----------------------~ 
Cal. S. Ct. points out, the closest analogy is the consolidation 
of individual arbitration proceedings_L a procedure that has re-
ceived some judicial acceptance. A student note in the Va. L. 
Rev. approves of the procedure adopted by the Cal. s. Ct., with 
some alterations. Classwide Arbitration: Efficient Adjudication 
or Procedural Quagmire?, 67 Va. L. Rev. 787 (1981). I think that 
since this question does not rise to the level of due process, 
the Cal. S. Ct. word on what is proper procedure in Cal. should 
prevail. 
Although the briefs do not go this far, I think an argument 
be made that the "body of substantive law" language in Moses 
Memorial Hosp. means that the courts must come up with a 
body of federal common law to fill in the interstices. The ques-
tion of class-wide arbitration would be one of those interstices. 
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entitled to some deference, see Hart & Wechsler, The Federal 
Courts and the Federal System, at 778-779,825-829 (2nd ed. 1973), 
and might be controlling if this is purely a question of proce-
dure. In addition, I think the Cal. S. Ct. was right; class-wide 
j~ arbitration seems to be a useful procedure in this case. ~  
III. CONCLUSION 
~he Court has jurisdiction over the 
issue~he strong language regarding 
arbitrability/preemption 
arbitration . v 1n Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hosp. leads to the conclusion that the FAA preempts 
the non-arbitrability aspects of the CFIL.~e ~ourt has no ju----risdiction with respect to the question of the appropriateness of 
class-wide arbitration because Southland failed to present the 
federal issue to the Cal. S. ct(j[Jven if there is jurisdiction, 
"'"'""""--- ~-- ...... ----
the Cal. S. Ct. is entitled to decide whether a class-wide arbi-
tration is acceptable. 
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Memorandum 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Rob 
Re: Another update on ~outhland v. Keating~ No. 82-500 ... 
.. 
I had a long discussion with one of Justice O'Connors clerks 
at lunch today about the Southland case. He has a theory (not 
propounded by the briefs) about the preemption/arbitrability 
issue that I thought might interest you. His theory's starting 
point (and major soft spot) is that the statement in Moses H. 
Cone that the FAA creates a body of federal substantive law that 
~-~~.~lies to the states is dicta. He contends that the legislative ' 
9 ~history behind the FAA ~::ates that Congress did ~ intend to 
~have the provisions of the FAA apply to actions in state courts. 
I_:_ t,,,t . 
TV Instead, Congress intended that the FAA create a body of substan-
tive law to apply only in federal diversity cases, a common con-
gressional purpose prior to Erie R. Co.. Thus, to the extent 
that it survived the Erie R. Co. decision, the FAA's provisions 
only apply to cases filed in federal court. Because the appees 
" 
filed this action in Cal. court, the FAA does not preempt the 
Cal. courts' treatment of the CFIL claims. 
Justice O'Connor's clerk's certainly has a better grasp of 
the FAA's legislative history than I do. In fact, many of his 
points come straight from a dissent that~stice Black wrote in 
Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 416 
(1967). The problem with his theory is twofold. First, the lan-
'(~ guage in Moses H. Cone cannot be dismissed easily. In that opin-
ion Justice Brennan is very explicit and relies on the majority 
opinion in~rima Paint. Second, the clerk's theory would lead to 
widespread forum shopping. If a plaintiff wishes to avoid arbi-
tration and can do so simply by filing in state court, he will 
file in state court and fight removal to federal district court. 
In short, I do not adhere to the new theory, but I suspect that 
you will he'tf about it again. 
: 
. .. .. 
• 
Sec. 4 ENFORCING STATE- CREATED RIGHTS 731 
Vermont law an agreement to arbitrate is revocable at any time prior to an 
award and is therefore not enforceable. The Second Circuit reversed, but 
the Supreme Court agreed with the district court, saying (p. 203): 
'' • • • If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court 
would disallow it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse 
where suit is brought. For the remedy by arbitration, whatever its merits 
or shortcomings, substantially affects the cause of action created by the State. 
The nature of the tribunal where suits · are tried is an important part of the 
parcel of rights behind a cause of action." 
The Court held, as a matter of statutory construction, that the provisions 
for judicial enforcement of certain agreements to arbitrate in the United 
States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1- 14,2 did not apply to the case at hand, 
noting (p. 202) that "If respondent's contention (that the Act applied) 
is correct, a constitutional question might be presented. Erie R. Co. v. 
Tompkins indicated that Congress does no't have the constitutional authority 
to make the law that is applicable to controversies in diversity of citizenship 
cases.'' · 
r--__;;;;Is~an:.:.J thing left of Guffey after Bernhardt? 3 
( 6~e constitutional question raised in Bernhardt was answe~ed, in 
part, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 
\ I ( 1967). 1 In this diversity action, Prima sought rescission of a consulting 
agreement on the basis of fraudulent inducement, and Flood & Conklin, 
relying on the Arbitration Act, filed a motion to stay the action pending 
arbitration of the issue of fraud under an arbitration clause in the contract. 
The Supreme Court held, 6-3, that the stay was properly granted under the 
Act, even though such a stay (for arbitration of the issue of fraud) might 
not have been obtainable had the action been brought in a state court. The 
Arbitration Act applied because, unlike the contract at issue in Bernhardt, 
the contract in Prima was one "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" 
within the meaning of § 2 of the Act. Application of the Act was constitu-
tionally permissible because the question in the case was "not whether Con-
gress may fashion federal substantive rules to govern questions arising in 
simple diversity cases"; rather it was "whether Congress may prescribe how 
federal courts are to conduct themselves with respect to subject matter (in-
terstate commerce] over which Congress plainly has power to legislate" . 
The answer, the Court concluded, "can only be in the affirmative" (p. 405 ). 
But the Court carefully avoided any explicit endorsement of the view that 
2. The ArlJitration Act, ori~inally en-
acted in 1!)25, JlrO\'ides in § 2 that a 
written arhitration pro\'i~ion "in any 
maritime transaction or a contra('t e\'i -
tlencin~ a transaction in\'olYin,:: com -
merce • • sha 11 he \'a lid, i r-
re\'ocahle, :uul l'llforc<•ahle, sa,·e upon 
such grouculs as exist at law or in 
equity for the re,·ocation of any con· 
tract"; in § 3 that a federal court 
in which suit is hronght on an is~nc 
referrahle to arlJitration hy an arbi-
tration a~,:ri'<'IIH'IIt mnst stay its own 
procee<lings peucling arhitration once 
it has <lecicle<l that the issou• is arhi-
trahle unclcr the agreencent; :uul in 
§ -l that a fecleral conrt whosp as-
sistancc is properly irn·okecl hy a party 
to an arbitration a,::reenrent !'hail or-
der arhitration. 
3. Sec StPm \'. South Chl•ster Tube Co., 
3!)0 U.S. GOG, GW-10 (l!lGS): "\\'e n('('cl 
not clf'eiclf' whethf'r this [dh·e•·sity ac-
tion] is a case where such a federal 
rcmc<ly can he prodclecl C\'Cll in the 
alJsence of a similar state remedy, 
!'>hlly Oil Co. , .. Phillips Co., 33!l U.S. 
CG7, GI-l (JQ;"-.Q); ct. Guffey Y. Smith, 
2:37 U.:-5. 101 (lfJl:il, h<·cause it is clear 
that state law here also prO\'iclcs for 
l'nforc·eflrL'nt of the shareholder's right 
[to inspect corporate records] by a 
<'OIIIJllllsory judicial order." 
"u: .ruonra!lon 1\ct embodied substantive policies that were to be a) lied 
to a contracts within its scope, w et er sue on Jn state or ederal courts. 
This view had been a ope m o er awrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, 
Inc., 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959), cerl. granted, 362 U.S. 909, dismisud 
11nder R11/e 60, 364 U.S. 801 ( 1960), and Justice Harlan, concurring in 
Prima, said that he "would also affirm the judgment below" on the basis 
of Devonshire (p. 407). 
How stable is the result in the Prima case if it contemplates different 
remedies in federal and state courts for breach of the same contract? 4 Com-
pare the demise of a similar (but converse)' distinction between state and 
federal remedies in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 
(1970), p. 1201, infra. 
(7) Are considerations different from those in Guffey and Bernhardt 
involved when state law, and particularly the availabili~y of an equitable 
remedy in the state courts, is urged not as a reason for denying federal equita-
ble relief but for granting it? To what extent do Erie-Klaxon-York require 
federal courts to mirror state courts in this respect also? 
In Pusey & Jones Co. v. Hanssen, 261 U.S. 491 ( 1923), a Delaware 
statute authorizing the appointment of a receiver upon the application of a 
simple contract creditor \Vas denied enforcement. In a much-cited opinion 
for the Court, Justice Brandeis said (pp. 497- 99): 
"That this suit could not be maintained in the absence of the statute 
is clear. A receiver is often appointed upon application of a secured creditor 
who fears that his security will be. wasted. Kountze v. Omaha Hotel Co., 
107 U.S. 3 78, 395. A receiver is often appointed upon appliciltion of a 
judgment creditor who has exhausted his legal remedy. See White v. Ewing, 
159 U.S. 36. But an unsecured simple contract creditor has, in the absence 
of statute, no substantive right, legal or equitable, in or to the property of 
his debtor. This is true, whatever the nature of the property; and although 
the debtor is a corporation and insolvent. The only substantive right of a 
simple contract creditor is to have his debt paid in due course. His adjec-
tive right is, ordinarily at law. He has no right whatsoever in equity until 
he has exhausted his legal remedy. After execution upon a judgment re-
covered at law has been returned unsatisfied, he may proceed in equity by 
a creditor's bill. Hollins v. Brierfield Coal & Iron Co., 150 U.S. 3 71 
• • • He may, by such a bill, remove any obstacle to satisfying his exe-
cution at law; or may reach assets equitable in their nature; or he may pro-
visionally protect his debtor's property from misappropriation or waste, 
by means either of an injunction or a receiver. Whether the debtor be an 
4. In A/S J. Ludwig ~rowinckels Rederi 
, .. Dow Chem. Co., 25 N.Y.2d 57G, 255 
K.E.2d 774 (JD70), the petitioner 
l>rought a ;;tate c-ourt action to enjoin 
arbitration under a maritime c-ontract 
on gr·oun!ls that would conceded ly have 
hecn unaYailable to him in a federal 
court because of the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act. After cxtensin? analysis of 
l'rima Paint, the New York Court of 
Appeals concluded that at least in the 
case of a maritime contract, where 
federal substantive law "controls" all 
a~pccts of the agreement, the Arbitra-
tion Act had to be applied in the state 
courts as wei!" as in the federal courts. 
The effect of this conclusion was to 
deny a stay of arbitration hecause 
such a stay would ha,·e been unavail-
able in a federal court. Compare In re 
Vigo S. S. Corp., 2G N.Y.2d 157, 162, 
257 ?\.E.2d 624, G2G (J!JIO) (consolida-
tion of arbitration proceedings under 
maritime contracts allowed pursuant 
to state law; the issue was "pro-
cedural" and "not ln any way deter-
minath·e of the outcome of the dis-
putes on the merits"). 
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Memorandum 
To: Justice Powell 
From: Rob 
Date: August 10, 1983 
Re: Southland v. Keating, No. 82-500 
Southland's reply brief came in yesterday. Southland raised 
only two new points in this brief. First, it responds to appees' --·--------argument that the arbitration clause by its own terms does not 
cover appees' CFIL claims. Southland asserts that the appees did 
not make this argument in the Cal. S. Ct. and, therefore, they 
are foreclosed from making it now. Southland maintains that, in 
any event, appees' argument is meritless because it is not a val-
id attack on the Court's jurisdiction and gives too narrow a 
reading to the arbitration clause. Because I saw no merit in 
the appees' argument anyway, the V:eply brief does not affect the 
analysis in my bench memo. 
The second new argument in the reply brief applies to the 
appees' contention that the Cal. courts could circumvent the FAA 
by finding the arbitration clause of the franchise agreement un-
conscionable. Southland argues that the appees have failed to 
identify any provision of the franchise agreement that is uncon-
scionable. It also asserts that a finding of unconscionability 
based solely on arbi trabi li ty grounds would violate §2 of the 
; " 
page 2. 
FAA. The appees' reference to unconscionability is intended to 
show only that the Cal. courts would retain control over a class-
wide arbitration, and is not an integral part of their argument. 
The remainder of the reply brief simply ~ehashes or restates 
arguments made in Southland's original brief. 
The Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Memo: To my Clerk 
From: L.F.P., Jr. 
This .case is here on appeal from the Supreme Court of 
California. I do not recall whether we "Noted" or "Post-
poned". Nor do I recall whether this is one of the cases 
assigned for a summer bench memo. I have now taken a pre-
liminary look at the opinions below, and the briefs. The case 
is important with respect to the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). 
I am not fully familiar with the area, the questions are not 
easy, and accordingly I particularly need help from my clerk. 
Apart from alerting my clerk to this need, this memo merely 
identifies - briefly - the issues in summary form - as I pre-
sently understand them. 
The Controversey 
Southland, a Texas corporation that owns and franchises 
7/11 convenience stores in many states, has several hundred 
franchisees in California. 
Appellees here (plaintiffs below) are several California 
franchisees who initially instituted separate suits against 
Southland. Allegations included violations of the disclosure 
2. 
requirements of the California Franchise Investment Law -
a statute quite similar to the Uniform State Securities Acts. 
In addition, there are various common law allegations of fraud 
and breach of contract. After Southland's unsuccessful attempt 
to transfer the litigation to Federal Court, appellees separate 
suits were consolidated in this state case. It has gone up 
through the three tiers of California courts on the substantitive 
issues presented by this appeal, but has not yet been tried on 
its merits. In a rather impressively written opinion, the 
California Supreme Court decided these issues in favor of 
appellees, with two of six Justices dissenting in significant 
part. 
Our Jurisdiction 
The parties initially debate our jurisdiction because the 
"bottom line" of the California decision is to remand the case 
to the trial court. My present impression is that, as argued 
by appellants, we have jurisdiction under the principles of 
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan. Controlling issues of law, 
including applicability of the FAA, have been finally decided. 
The Preemption Issue 
Southland's franchise agreements contain an arbitration 
clause providing: 
3. 
"[a)ny controversy or claim arising out of 
or relating to this Agreement or the breach thereof 
shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with 
the Rules of the American Arbitration Association ••. 
and judgment upon any award rendered by the arbitrator 
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof." 
Southland has argued from the beginning that its arbitra-
tion clause is enforceable and mandatory, and precludes this 
litigation. As I understand the situation, it is necessary to 
keep in mind the two types of claims asserted by appellees: 
(i) that Southland v iolated § 31202 of the California 
Corporation Code by making untrue statements of material fact, 
and willfully omitting to include all material £acts, 
in violation of the state's Franchise Investment Act; 
(ii) that Southland was guilty of common law fraud and 
breach of contract. 
The Franchise Investment Act provides: 
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compliance 
with any provision of this law or any rule or order here-
under is void." 
4. 
The California Court held, with respect to the preemption 
issue, that the issue is as follows: 
"Whether the principles of substantitive Federal 
law embodied in the Federal Arbitration Act preclude a 
state from protecting its franchise investors through a 
system of statutory regulation including nonwaivability 
of judicial remedies." 
In answering this question negatively (i.e. no Federal 
preemption), the California Court relied in major part on its 
view that the California Legislature intended to adopt in its 
Franchise Investment Law the same "antiwaiver" provisions that 
Congress had included in the Federal Securities Acts. In 
Wilko v. Swan, 346 u.s. 427, this Court interpreted these 
act as holding that judicial remedies could not be waived in 
advance by contract. In other words, certain types of rights 
created for the protection of the public may be vindicated in 
a court regardless of the waiver of judicial remedies implicit 
in the Federal Arbitration Act. 
As persuasive as the opinion of the California Court is 
on the preempt i on issue, the appellants' brief (by Arnold 
and Porter) - at least on the surface - appears to give 
equally persuasive answers. See also Justice Richardson's 
5. 
dissenting opinion on this issue. But compare the arguments 
made in the amicus brief on behalf of the State of Washington 
and the North American Securities Administrators Association. 
The Class Action Issue 
The second major issue in the case is whether the California 
Court correctly held ~at a class action - under the California 
Class Action Procedure - could be appropriate in this case, and 
remanded the case for consideration by the trial court of the 
extent to which a class action will be appropriate even in 
complying with the arbitration provisions of the franchise 
agreements. · 
Again, rather persuasive arguments are advanced on both 
sides of this issue. At this point, I am not familiar enough 
with the case or the authorities relied upon, to have even a 
tentative view. Intuitively, I would think class action proce-
dures inherently are incompatible with the basic purposes of 
arbitration. 
* * * 
There are other aspects of this case that l have not 
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From: The Chief Justice 
j) 1 'l 1003 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
1st DRAFT 
SUPREME, COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 82-500 
SOUTHLAND CORPORATION, ETAL., APPELLANTS v. 
RICHARD D. KEATING ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA 
[January -, 1984] 
CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider (a) whether the 
California Franchise Investment Law, which invalidates cer-
tain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether ar-
bitration under the Federal Act is impaired when a class 
action structure is imposed on the process by the state 
courts. 
I 
Appellant The Southland Corporation is the owner and 
franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores. Southland's 
standard franchise agreement provides each franchisee with 
a license to use certain registered trademarks, a lease or sub-
lease of a convenience store owned or leased by Southland, 
inventory financing, and assistance in advertising and mer-
chandising. The franchisees operate the stores, supply 
bookkeeping data, and pay Southland a fixed percentage of 
gross profits. The franchise agreement also contains the 
following provision requiring arbitration: 
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to 
this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any 
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any 
court having jurisdiction thereof." 
- ,. . 
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Appellees are 7-Eleven franchisees. Between September 
1975 and January 1977, several appellees filed individual ac-
tions against Southland in California Superior Court alleging, 
among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclo-
sure requirements of the California Franchise Investment 
Law, Cal. Corp. Code § 31000 et seq. (West 1977). South-
land's answer, in all but one of the individual actions, in-
cluded the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate. 
In May 1977, appellee Keating filed a class action against 
Southland on behalf of a class that assertedly includes ap-
proximately 800 California franchisees. Keating's principal 
claims were substantially the same as those asserted by the 
other franchisees. After the various actions were consoli-
dated, Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of the 
claims in all cases, and appellees moved for class certification. 
The Superior Court granted Southland's motion to compel 
arbitration of all claims except those claims based on the 
Franchise Investment Law. The court did not pass on ap-
pellees' request for class certification. Southland appealed 
from the order insofar as it excluded from arbitration the 
claims based on the California statute. Appellees filed a pe-
tition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the California 
Court of Appeal arguing that the arbitration should proceed 
as a class action. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's 
refusal to compel arbitration of appellees' claims under the 
Franchise Investment Law. 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980). 
That court interpreted the arbitration clause to require ar-
bitration of all claims asserted under the Franchise Invest-
ment Law, and construed the Franchise Investment Law not 
to invalidate such agreements to arbitrate. 1 Alternatively, 
the court concluded that if the Franchise Investment Law 
' Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 provides: "Any condition, stipulation or provi-
sion purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." 
.. 82--5~0PINION 
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rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unen-
forceable, it would conflict with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U. S. C. §2 (1976), and therefore be invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 493-494. The Court 
of Appeal also determined that there was no "insurmountable 
obstacle" to conducting an arbitration on a classwide basis, 
and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to con-
duct class certification proceedings. I d., at 492. 
The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, reversed 
the ruling that claims asserted under the Franchise Invest-
ment Law are arbitrable. 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P. 2d 1192 
(1982). The California Supreme Court interpreted the Fran-
chise Investment Law to require judicial consideration of 
claims brought under that statute and concluded that the 
California statute did not contravene the federal Act. I d., at 
604, 645 P. 2d, 1203-1204. The court also remanded the case 
to the trial court for consideration of appellees' request for 
classwide arbitration. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
We reverse in part and dismiss in part. 
II 
A 
Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257(2) which provides for an appeal from a final judgment 
of the highest court of a state when the validity of a chal-
lenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal 
law. Here Southland challenged the California Franchise 
Investment Law as it was applied to invalidate a contract for 
arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Appellee argues that the action of the California Supreme 
Court with respect to this claim is not a "final judgment or 
decree" within the meaning of § 1257(2). 
Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 
482-483 (1975), judgments of state courts that finally decide a 
federal issue are immediately appealable when "the party 
82--500--0PINION 
4 SOUTHLAND CORP. v. KEATING 
seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the 
merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary 
review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal 
of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of 
any further litigation on the relevant cause of action. . . . " 
In these circumstances, we have resolved the federal issue "if 
a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision 
might seriously erode federal policy." Id., at 483. 
The judgment of the California Supreme Court with re-
spect to this claim is reviewable under Cox Broadcasting, 
supra. Without immediate review of the California holding 
by this Court there may be no opportunity to pass on the fed-
eral issue and as a result "there would remain in effect the 
unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court" holding 
that the California statute does not confict the Federal Ar-
bitration Act. I d., at 485. On the other hand, reversal of a 
state court judgment in this setting will terminate litigation 
of the merits of this dispute. 
Finally, the failure to accord immediate review of the deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court might "seriously erode 
federal policy." Plainly the effect of the judgment of the 
California court is to nullify a valid contract made by private 
parties under which they agreed to submit all contract dis-
putes to final, binding arbitration. The federal Act permits 
"parties to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and 
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible." Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 
- u. s. -,- (1983). 
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing 
one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. 
Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the 
very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought 
to eliminate. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U. S. 1, 12 (1972), we noted that the contract fixing a particu-
lar forum for resolution of all disputes 
82-500--0PINION 
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"was made in an ann's-length negotiation by experienced 
and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compel-
ling and countervailing reason it should be honored by 
the parties and enforced by the courts." 
The Zapata court also noted that 
"the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and 
it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not 
conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary 
terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figur-
ing prominently in their calculations." Id., at 14. 
For us to delay review of a state judicial decision denying 
enforcement of the contract to arbitrate until the state court 
litigation has run its course would defeat the core purpose of 
a contract to arbitrate. We hold that the Court has jurisdic-
tion to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law. 
B 
That part of the appeal relating to the propriety of super-
imposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration 
raises other questions. Southland did not contend in the 
California courts that, and the State courts did not decide 
whether, State law imposition class action procedures was 
preempted by federal law. When the California Court of 
Appeal directed Southland to address the question whether 
state or federal law controlled the class action issue, South-
land responded that State law did not permit arbitrations to 
proceed as class actions, that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were inapplicable, and that requiring arbitrations to 
proceed as class actions "could well violate the [federal] con-
stitutional guaranty of procedural due process." 2 Southland 
did not claim in the Court of Appeal that if State law required 
2 Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Petition for Writs of Mandate or Prohibition at 19-25. 
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class action procedures, it would conflict with the federal Act 
and thus violate the Supremacy Clause. 
In the California Supreme Court, Southland argued that 
California law applied but that neither the contract to arbi-
trate nor State law authorized class action procedures to gov-
ern arbitrations. Southland also contended that the Federal 
Rules were inapplicable in State proceedings. Southland 
pointed out that although California law provided a basis for 
class action procedures, the Judicial Council of California ac-
knowledged "the incompatibility of class actions and arbitra-
tion." Petition for Hearing at 23. It does not appear that 
Southland opposed class procedures onfederal grounds in the 
California Supreme Court. 3 Nor does the record show that 
the California Supreme Court passed upon the question 
whether superimposing class action procedures on a contract 
arbitration was contrary to the federal Act. 4 
3 The question Southland presented to the state Supreme Court was 
"[ w ]hether a court may enter an order compelling a private commercial ar-
bitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ... to proceed as a class 
action even though the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement do not 
provide for such a procedure." Southland argued that (1) the decision of 
the Court of Appeal "is in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Ap-
peal in this State," Petition for Hearing at 3; (2) class actions would delay 
and complicate arbitration, increase its cost, and require judicial supervi-
sion, "considerations [which] strongly militate against the creation of class 
action arbitration procedures," id., at 22; and (3) there was no basis in law 
for class actions. According to appellants, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure did not apply in California courts. I d., at 23. Southland thus re-
lied, not on federal law, but on California law in opposing class action 
procedures. 
4 The California Supreme Court cited "[a]nalogous authority'' support-
ing consolidation of arbitration proceedings by federal courts. E. g., 
Campania Espanola de Petrolowos, S . A . v. Nereus Shipping, S. A ., 527 
F. 2d 966, 975 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976); In re 
Czarnikow-Rionda Co ., 512 F . Supp. 1308, 1309 (SDNY 1981). This, 
along with support by other state courts and the California legislature for 
consolidation of arbitration proceedings permitted the court to conclude 
that class action proceedings were authorized: "It is unlikely that the state 
Legislature in adopting the amendment to the Arbitration Act authorizing 
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Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of 
the State statute was "drawn in question" on federal grounds 
by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve 
this question as a matter of federal law under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257(2). See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 207 
(1945). 
III 
The California Franchise Investment Law provides: 
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this law or any rule or order 
hereunder is void." Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 (West 
1977). 
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to re-
quire judicial consideration of claims brought under the State 
statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties' con-
tract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted the California 
Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause. 
In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared a na-
tional policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of 
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by ar-
bitration. The Federal Arbitration Act provides: 
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writ-
ing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
consolidation of arbitration proceedings, intended to preclude a court from 
ordering class wide arbitration in an appropriate case. We conclude that a 
court is not without authority to do so." 31 Cal. 3d, at 613, 645 P. 2d, at 
1209. The California Supreme Court thus ruled that imposing a class ac-
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ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (1976). 
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. 
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of ar-
bitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a 
contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" 5 and 
such clauses may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract." We see noth-
ing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforce-
ability is subject to any additional limitations under State 
law. 
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of Con-
gress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. 
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), the Court examined the legisla-
tive history of the Act and concluded that the statute "is 
based upon ... the incontestable federal foundations of 'con-
trol over interstate commerce and over admiralty."' Id., at 
405 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1924)). The contract in Prima .Paint, as here, contained an 
arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the 
other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, 
although not of arbitration clause in particular, and sought to 
have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal court. The 
Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, con-
sideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract 
"is for the arbitrators and not for the courts," id., at 400. 
6 We note that in defining "commerce" Congress declared that "nothing 
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class or workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce." 9 U. S. C. § 1 (1976). 
- " . 
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The Court relied for this holding on Congress' broad power to 
fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. 6 
At least since 1824 Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause has been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 
Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, the authority of Congress is "the power to regulate; 
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be gov-
erned." Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima Paint 
that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce 
Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the 
Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. As Jus-
tice Black observed in his dissent, when Congress exercises 
its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Com-
merce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable 
in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, 388 U. S., 
at 420 (Black, J., dissenting). 
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp., -- U. 8., at --, -- n. 32, we reaf-
firmed our view that the Arbitration Act "creates a body of 
federal substantive law" and expressly stated what was im-
plicit in Prima Paint, i. e., the substantive law the Act cre-
ated was applicable in state and federal court. Moses H. 
Cone began with a petition for an order to compel arbitration. 
The Di~trict Court stayed the action pending resolution of a 
concurrent state court suit. In holding that that the District 
Court had abused its discretion, we found no showing of ex-
ceptional circumstances justifying the stay and recognized 
"the presence of federal-law issues" under the federal Act as 
"a major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal 
jurisdiction]." Id., at--. We thus read the underlying 
issue of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal 
6 The procedures to be used in an arbitration are not prescribed by the 
federal Act. We note, however, that Prima Paint, supra, considered the 
question of what issues are for the courts and what issues are for the 
arbitrator. 
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law: "Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs 
that issue in either state or federal court." I d., at --. 
Although the legislative history is not without ambiguities, 
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind some-
thing more than making arbitration agreements enforceable 
only in the federal courts. The House Report plainly sug-
gests the more comprehensive objectives: 
"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible 
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involv-
ing interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or ad-
miralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the 
Federal courts." H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1924) (Emphasis added.) 
This broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality 
that Congress would be less likely to address a problem 
whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem 
of large significance in the field of commerce, problem Cerr---f 
l gress was addressing. The Arbitration Act sought to "over-
come the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically en-
force any arbitration agreement." Hearing on S. 4214 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) ("Senate Hearing") (remarks of 
Sen. Walsh). The House Report accompanying the bill 
stated: 
"[t]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of 
the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This 
jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle 
became firmly embedded in the English common law and 
was adopted with it by the American courts. The 
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly 
fixed to be overturned without legislative enact-
ment .... " H. R. Rep. No. 96, supra, 1-2 (1924). 
Surely this makes clear that the House Report contem-
plated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state law 
constraints. Congress also showed its awareness of the 
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widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements, e. g., Senate Hearing, supra, at 8, and that 
such courts were bound by state laws inadequately providing 
for 
"technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate 
under the method provided by the statute, you have an 
arbitration by statute[;] but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing 
to do with validating the contract to arbitrate." Ibid. 
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old 
common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of 
state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements. To confine the scope of the Act, as is 
urged by appellees, would frustrate what we believe Con-
gress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope 
to meet the problems Congress was addressing. 
Under the interpretation of the Arbitration Act urged by 
appellees, claims brought under the California Franchise In-
vestment Law are not arbitrable when they are raised in 
state court. Yet it is clear beyond question that if this suit 
had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district 
court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable. 7 
Prima Paint, supra. The interpretation given to the Ar-
bitration Act by the California Supreme Court would there-
fore encourage and reward forum shopping. We are unwill-
ing to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the 
comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a 
right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the 
right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum 
in which it is asserted. And since the overwhelming propor-
7 Appellees contend that the arbitration clause, which provides for the 
arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement or the breach hereof," does not cover their claims under the 
California Franchise Investment Law. We find the language quoted 
above broad enough to cover such claims. Cf. Prima Paint, supra, 388 
U. S., at 403-404, 406 (finding nearly identical language to cover a claim 
that a contract was induced by fraud) . 
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tion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, 8 
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration 
Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction. 9 
Appellees' interpretation would frustrate Congressional in-
tent to place "[a]n arbitration agreement ... upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H. R. Rep. 
No. 96, supra, 1. 
In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as 
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legisla-
tive attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. 10 We hold that § 31512 of the California Fran-
chise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause. 
IV 
The judgment of the California Supreme Court denying en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement is reversed; as to the 
question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a 
8 It is estimated that 2% of all civil litigation in this country is in the 
federal courts. Administrative Office of the United States Court, Annual 
Report of the Director 3 (1982) (206,000 filings in federal district court in 
twelve months ending June 30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy filings); 
Flango, Advance Report-The Latest State Court Caseload Data, State 
Court Journal, p. 18 (Winter 1983) (approximately 13,600,000 civil filings 
during comparable period, excluding traffic filings). 
• While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law re-
quiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any 
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976) 
or otherwise. Moses H. Cone,-- U. S., at-- n. 32. Section 4 pro-
vides for an order compelling arbitration, and § 3 provides for a stay of fed-
eral court proceedings, only when the federal district court has jurisdiction 
over the underlying dispute. Ibid. 
10 The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our 
conclusion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), that arbitration agree-
ments are nonbinding as to claims arising under the federal Securities Act 
of 1933. 31 Cal. 3d at 602, 645 P. 2d at 1202-1203. The analogy is unper-
suasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could 
create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but rather whether Con-
gress, in subsequently enacting the Securities Act, had in fact created such 
an exception. 
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class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the 
California courts, no decision by this Court would be appro-
priate at this time. As to the latter issues, the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We noted probable jurisdiction to consider (a) whether the 
California Franchise Investment Law, which invalidates cer-
tain arbitration agreements covered by the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act, violates the Supremacy Clause and (b) whether ar-
bitration under the Federal Act is impaired when a class 
action structure is imposed on the process by the state 
courts. 
I 
Appellant The Southland Corporation is the owner and 
franchisor of 7-Eleven convenience stores. Southland's 
standard franchise agreement provides each franchisee with 
a license to use certain registered trademarks, a lease or sub-
lease of a convenience store owned or leased by Southland, 
inventory financing, and assistance in advertising and mer-
chandising. The franchisees operate the stores, supply 
bookkeeping data, and pay Southland a fixed percentage of 
gross profits. The franchise agreement also contains the 
following provision requiring arbitration: 
"Any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to 
this Agreement or the breach thereof shall be settled by 
arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the American 
Arbitration Association . . . and judgment upon any 
award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any 
court having jurisdiction thereof." 
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Appellees are 7-Eleven franchisees. Between September 
1975 and January 1977, several appellees filed individual ac-
tions against Southland in California Superior Court alleging, 
among other things, fraud, oral misrepresentation, breach of 
contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of the disclo-
sure requirements of the California Franchise Investment 
Law, Cal. Corp. Code §31000 et seq. (West 1977). South-
land's answer, in all but one of the individual actions, in-
cluded the affirmative defense of failure to arbitrate. 
In May 1977, appellee Keating filed a class action against 
Southland on behalf of a class that assertedly includes ap-
proximately 800 California franchisees. Keating's principal 
claims were substantially the same as those asserted by the 
other franchisees. After the various actions were consoli-
dated, Southland petitioned to compel arbitration of the 
claims in all cases, and appellees moved for class certification. 
The Superior Court granted Southland's motion to compel 
arbitration of all claims except those claims based on the 
Franchise Investment Law. The court did not pass on ap-
pellees' request for class certification. Southland appealed 
from tlie order insofar as it excluded from arbitration the 
claims based on the California statute. Appellees filed a pe-
tition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition in the California 
Court of Appeal arguing that the arbitration should proceed 
as a class action. 
The California Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's 
refusal to compel arbitration of appellees' claims under the 
Franchise Investment Law. 167 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1980). 
That court interpreted the arbitration clause to require ar-
bitration of all claims asserted under the Franchise Invest-
ment Law, and construed the Franchise Investment Law not 
to invalidate such agreements to arbitrate. 1 Alternatively, 
the court concluded that if the Franchise Investment Law 
1 Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 provides: "Any condition, stipulation or provi-
sion purporting to bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this law or any rule or order hereunder is void." 
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rendered arbitration agreements involving commerce unen-
forceable, it would conflict with § 2 of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, 9 U. S. C. §2 (1976), and therefore be invalid under the 
Supremacy Clause. 167 Cal. Rptr. at 493-494. The Court 
of Appeal also determined that there was no "insurmountable 
obstacle" to conducting an arbitration on a classwide basis, 
and issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to con-
duct class certification proceedings. I d., at 492. 
The California Supreme Court, by a vote of 4-2, reversed 
the ruling that claims asserted under the Franchise Invest-
ment Law are arbitrable. 31 Cal. 3d 584, 645 P. 2d 1192 
(1982). The California Supreme Court interpreted the Fran-
chise Investment Law to require judicial consideration of 
claims brought under that statute and concluded that the 
California statute did not contravene the federal Act. I d., at 
604, 645 P. 2d, 1203-1204. The court also remanded the case 
to the trial court for consideration of appellees' request for 
classwide arbitration. 
We noted probable jurisdiction, -- U. S. -- (1982). 
We reverse in part and dismiss in part. 
II 
A 
Jurisdiction of this Court is asserted under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257(2) which provides for an appeal from a final judgment 
of the highest court of a state when the validity of a chal-
lenged state statute is sustained as not in conflict with federal 
law. Here Southland challenged the California Franchise 
Investment Law as it was applied to invalidate a contract for 
arbitration made pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. 
Appellee argues that the action of the California Supreme 
Court with respect to this claim is not a "final judgment or 
decree" within the meaning of § 1257(2). 
Under Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U. S. 469, 
482--483 (1975), judgments of state courts that finally decide a 
federal issue are immediately appealable when "the party 
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seeking review here might prevail [in the state court] on the 
merits on nonfederal grounds, thus rendering unnecessary 
review of the federal issue by this Court, and where reversal 
of the state court on the federal issue would be preclusive of 
any further litigation on the relevant cause of action .... " 
In these circumstances, we have resolved the federal issue "if 
a refusal immediately to review the state-court decision 
might seriously erode federal policy." ld., at 483. 
The judgment of the California Supreme Court with re-
spect to this claim is reviewable under Cox Broadcasting, 
supra. Without immediate review of the California holding 
by this Court there may be no opportunity to pass on the fed-
eral issue and as a result "there would remain in effect the 
unreviewed decision of the State Supreme Court" holding 
that the California statute does not confict the Federal Ar-
bitration Act. I d., at 485. On the other hand, reversal of a 
state court judgment in this setting will terminate litigation 
of the merits of this dispute. 
Finally, the failure to accord immediate review of the deci-
sion of the California Supreme Court might "seriously erode 
federal policy." Plainly the effect of the judgment of the 
California court is to nullify a valid contract made by private 
parties under which they agreed to submit all contract dis-
putes to final, binding arbitration. The federal Act permits 
"parties to an arbitrable dispute [to move] out of court and 
into arbitration as quickly and easily as possible." Moses H. 
Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp., 
- u. s. -, - (1983). 
Contracts to arbitrate are not to be avoided by allowing 
one party to ignore the contract and resort to the courts. 
Such a course could lead to prolonged litigation, one of the 
very risks the parties, by contracting for arbitration, sought 
to eliminate. In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 
U. S. 1, 12 (1972), we noted that the contract fixing a particu-
lar forum for resolution of all disputes 
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"was made in an arm's-length negotiation by experienced 
and sophisticated businessmen, and absent some compel-
ling and countervailing reason it should be honored by 
the parties and enforced by the courts." 
The Zapata court also noted that 
"the forum clause was a vital part of the agreement, and 
it would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not 
conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary 
terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figur-
ing prominently in their calculations." ld., at 14. 
For us to delay review of a state judicial decision denying 
enforcement of the contract to arbitrate until the state court 
litigation has run its course would defeat the core purpose of 
a contract to arbitrate. We hold that the Court has jurisdic-
tion to decide whether the Federal Arbitration Act preempts 
§ 31512 of the California Franchise Investment Law. 
B 
That part of the appeal relating to the propriety of super-
imposing class action procedures on a contract arbitration 
raises other questions. Southland did not contend in the 
California courts that, and the State courts did not decide 
whether, State law imposition class action procedures was 
preempted by federal law. When the California Court of 
Appeal directed Southland to address the question whether 
state or federal law controlled the class action issue, South-
land responded that State law did not permit arbitrations to 
proceed as class actions, that the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure were inapplicable, and that requiring arbitrations to 
proceed as class actions "could well violate the [federal] con-
stitutional guaranty of procedural due process." 2 Southland 
did not claim in the Court of Appeal that if State law required 
2 Supplemental Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Petition for Writs of Mandate or Prohibition at 19--25. 
I ~ 
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class action procedures, it would conflict with the federal Act 
and thus violate the Supremacy Clause. 
In the California Supreme Court, Southland argued that 
California law applied but that neither the contract to arbi-
trate nor State law authorized class action procedures to gov-
ern arbitrations. Southland also contended that the Federal 
Rules were inapplicable in State proceedings. Southland 
pointed out that although California law provided a basis for 
class action procedures, the Judicial Council of California ac-
knowledged "the incompatibility of class actions and arbitra-
tion." Petition for Hearing at 23. It does not appear that 
Southland opposed class procedures onfederal grounds in the 
California Supreme Court. 3 Nor does the record show that 
the California Supreme Court passed upon the question 
whether superimposing class action procedures on a contract 
arbitration was contrary to the federal Act. 4 
3 The question Southland presented to the state Supreme Court was 
"[ w ]hether a court may enter an order compelling a private commercial ar-
bitration governed by the Federal Arbitration Act ... to proceed as a class 
action even though the terms of the parties' arbitration agreement do not 
provide for such a procedure." Southland argued that (1) the decision of 
the Court of Appeal "is in conflict with the decisions of other Courts of Ap-
peal in this State," Petition for Hearing at 3; (2) class actions would delay 
and complicate arbitration, increase its cost, and require judicial supervi-
sion, "considerations [which] strongly militate against the creation of class 
action arbitration procedures," id., at 22; and (3) there was no basis in law 
for class actions. According to appellants, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure did not apply in California courts. I d., at 23. Southland thus re-
lied, not on federal law, but on California law in opposing class action 
procedures. 
'The California Supreme Court cited "[a]nalogous authority'' support-
ing consolidation of arbitration proceedings by federal courts. E. g., 
Compania Espanola de Petrolowos, S. A . v. Nereus Shipping, S . A., 527 
F. 2d 966, 975 (CA2 1975), cert. denied, 426 U. S. 936 (1976); In re 
Czarnikow-Rionda Co., 512 F. Supp. 1308, 1309 (SDNY 1981). This, 
along with support by other state courts and the California legislature for 
consolidation of arbitration proceedings permitted the court to conclude 
that class action proceedings were authorized: "It is unlikely that the state 
Legislature in adopting the amendment to the Arbitration Act authorizing 
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Since it does not affirmatively appear that the validity of 
the State statute was "drawn in question" on federal grounds 
by Southland, this Court is without jurisdiction to resolve 
this question as a matter of federal law under 28 U. S. C. 
§ 1257(2). See Bailey v. Anderson, 326 U. S. 203, 207 
(1945). 
III 
The California Franchise Investment Law provides: 
"Any condition, stipulation or provision purporting to 
bind any person acquiring any franchise to waive compli-
ance with any provision of this law or any rule or order 
hereunder is void." Cal. Corp. Code § 31512 (West 
1977). 
The California Supreme Court interpreted this statute to re-
quire judicial consideration of claims brought under the State 
statute and accordingly refused to enforce the parties' con-
tract to arbitrate such claims. So interpreted the California 
Franchise Investment Law directly conflicts with § 2 of the 
Federal Arbitration Act and violates the Supremacy Clause. 
In enacting § 2 of the federal Act, Congress declared ana-
tional policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the power of 
the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of 
claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by ar-
bitration. The Federal Arbitration Act provides: 
"A written provision in any maritime transaction or a 
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to 
settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform 
the whole or any part thereof, or an agreement in writ-
ing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy aris-
consolidation of arbitration proceedings, intended to preclude a court from 
ordering classwide arbitration in an appropriate case. We conclude that a 
court is not without authority to do so." 31 Cal. 3d, at 613, 645 P. 2d, at 
1209. The California Supreme Court thus ruled that imposing a class ac-
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ing out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall 
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of 
any contract." 9 U. S. C. § 2 (1976). 
Congress has thus mandated the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements. 
We discern only two limitations on the enforceability of ar-
bitration provisions governed by the Federal Arbitration 
Act: they must be part of a written maritime contract or a 
contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce" 6 and 
such clauses may be revoked upon "grounds as exist at law or 
in equity for the revocation of any contract." We see noth-
ing in the Act indicating that the broad principle of enforce-
ability is subject to any additional limitations under State 
law. 
The Federal Arbitration Act rests on the authority of· Con-
gress to enact substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. 
In Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing 
Corp., 388 U. S. 395 (1967), the Court examined the legisla-
tive history of the Act and concluded that the statute "is 
based upon . . . the incontestable federal foundations of 'con-
trol over interstate commerce and over admiralty."' I d., at 
405 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 
(1924)). The contract in Prima Paint, as here, contained an 
arbitration clause. One party in that case alleged that the 
other had committed fraud in the inducement of the contract, 
~~- althou~arbitration clause in particular, and sought to 
have the claim of fraud adjudicated in federal court. The 
Court held that, notwithstanding a contrary state rule, con-
sideration of a claim of fraud in the inducement of a contract 
"is for the arbitrators and not for the courts," id., at 400. 
' We note that in defining "commerce" Congress declared that "nothing 
herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, rail-
road employees, or any other class or workers engaged in foreign or inter-
state commerce." 9 U. S. C. § 1 (1976). 
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The Court relied for this holding on Congress' broad power to 
fashion substantive rules under the Commerce Clause. 6 
At least since 1824 Congress' authority under the Com-
merce Clause has been held plenary. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 
Wheat. 1, 196 (1824). In the words of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, the authority of Congress is "the power to regulate; 
that is, to prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be gov-
erned." Ibid. The statements of the Court in Prima Paint 
that the Arbitration Act was an exercise of the Commerce 
Clause power clearly implied that the substantive rules of the 
Act were to apply in state as well as federal courts. As Jus-
tice Black observed in his dissent, when Congress exercises 
its authority to enact substantive federal law under the Com-
merce Clause, it normally creates rules that are enforceable 
in state as well as federal courts. Prima Paint, 388 U. S., 
at 420 (Black, J., dissenting). 
In Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Con-
struction Corp., -- U. S., at --, -- n. 32, we reaf-
firmed our view that the Arbitration Act "creates a body of 
federal substantive law" and expressly stated what was im-
plicit in Prima Paint, i. e., the substantive law the Act cre-
ated was applicable in state and federal court. Moses H. 
Cone began with a petition for an order to compel arbitration. 
The District Court stayed the action pending resolution of a 
concurrent state court suit. In holding that that the District 
Court had abused its discretion, we found no showing of ex-
ceptional circumstances justifying the stay and recognized 
"the presence of federal-law issues" under the federal Act as 
"a major consideration weighing against surrender [of federal 
jurisdiction]." Id., at--. We thus read the underlying 
issue of arbitrability to be a question of substantive federal 
6 The procedures to be used in an arbitration are not prescribed by the 
federal Act. We note, however, that Prima Paint, supra, considered the 
question of what issues are for the courts and what issues are for the 
arbitrator. 
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law: "Federal law in the terms of the Arbitration Act governs 
that issue in either state or federal court." I d., at--. 
Alth.ough the legislative history is not without ambiguities, 
there are strong indications that Congress had in mind some-
thing more than making arbitration agreements enforceable 
only in the federal courts. The House Report plainly sug-
gests the more comprehensive objectives: 
"The purpose of this bill is to make valid and enforcible 
agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involv-
ing interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or ad-
miralty, or which may be the subject of litigation in the 
Federal courts." H. R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 1 (1924) (Emphasis added.) 
This broader purpose can also be inferred from the reality 
that Congress would be less likely to address a problem 
whose impact was confined to federal courts than a problem 
of large significance in the field of commerce,pt:oblem Co11---P J gress was addressiHg. ' The Arbitration Act sought to "over-
come the rule of equity, that equity will not specifically en-
force any arbitration agreement." Hearing on S. 4214 
Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
67th Cong., 4th Sess. 6 (1923) ("Senate Hearing") (remarks of 
Sen. Walsh). The House Report accompanying the bill 
stated: 
"[t]he need for the law arises from ... the jealousy of 
the English courts for their own jurisdiction. . . . This 
jealousy survived for so lon[g] a period that the principle 
became firmly embedded in the English common law and 
was adopted with it by the American courts. The 
courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly 
fixed to be overturned without legislative enact-
ment .... " H. R. Rep. No. 96, supra, 1-2 (1924). 
Surely this makes clear that the House Report contem-
plated a broad reach of the Act, unencumbered by state law 
constraints. Congress also showed its awareness of the 
82--500-0PINION 
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widespread unwillingness of state courts to enforce arbitra-
tion agreements, e. g., Senate Hearing, supra, at 8, and that 
such courts were bound by state laws inadequately providing 
for 
"technical arbitration by which, if you agree to arbitrate 
under the method provided by the statute, you have an 
arbitration by statute[;] but [the statutes] ha[d] nothing 
to do with validating the contract to arbitrate." Ibid. 
The problems Congress faced were therefore twofold: the old 
common law hostility toward arbitration, and the failure of 
state arbitration statutes to mandate enforcement of arbitra-
tion agreements. To confine the scope of the Act, as is 
urged by appellees, would frustrate what we believe Con-
gress intended to be a broad enactment appropriate in scope 
to meet the problems Congress was addressing. 
Under the interpretation of the Arbitration Act urged by 
appellees, claims brought under the California Franchise In-
vestment Law are not arbitrable when they are raised in 
state court. Yet it is clear beyond question that if this suit 
had been brought as a diversity action in a federal district 
court, the arbitration clause would have been enforceable. 7 
Prima Paint, supra. The interpretation given to the Ar-
bitration Act by the California Supreme Court would there-
fore encourage and reward forum shopping. We are unwill-
ing to attribute to Congress the intent, in drawing on the 
comprehensive powers of the Commerce Clause, to create a 
right to enforce an arbitration contract and yet make the 
right dependent for its enforcement on the particular forum 
in which it is asserted. And since the overwhelming propor-
' Appellees contend that the arbitration clause, which provides for the 
arbitration of "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this 
Agreement or the breach hereof," does not cover their claims under the 
California Franchise Investment Law. We find the language quoted 
above broad enough to cover such claims. Cf. Prima Paint , supra, 388 
U. S., at 403--404, 406 (finding nearly identical language to cover a claim 
that a contract was induced by fraud). 
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tion of all civil litigation in this country is in the state courts, 8 
we cannot believe Congress intended to limit the Arbitration 
Act to disputes subject only to federal court jurisdiction. 9 
Appellees' interpretation would frustrate Congressional in-
tent to place "[a]n arbitration agreement ... upon the same 
footing as other contracts, where it belongs." H. R. Rep. 
No. 96, supra, 1. 
In creating a substantive rule applicable in state as well as 
federal courts, Congress intended to foreclose state legisla-
tive attempts to undercut the enforceability of arbitration 
agreements. 10 We hold that § 31512 of the California Fran-
chise Investment Law violates the Supremacy Clause. 
IV 
The judgment of the California Supreme Court denying en-
forcement of the arbitration agreement is reversed; as to the 
question whether the Federal Arbitration Act precludes a 
8 It is estimated that 2% of all civil litigation in this country is in the 
federal courts. Administrative Office of the United States Court, Annual 
Report of the Director 3 (1982) (206,000 filings in federal district court in 
twelve months ending June 30, 1982, excluding bankruptcy filings); 
Flango, Advance Report-The Latest State Court Caseload Data, State 
Court Journal, p. 18 (Winter 1983) (approximately 13,600,000 civil filings 
during comparable period, excluding traffic filings). 
9 While the Federal Arbitration Act creates federal substantive law re-
quiring the parties to honor arbitration agreements, it does not create any 
independent federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U. S. C. § 1331 (1976) 
or otherwise. Moses H. Cone,-- U. S., at-- n. 32. Section 4 pro-
vides for an order compelling arbitration, and § 3 provides for a stay of fed-
eral court proceedings, only when the federal district court has jurisdiction 
over the underlying dispute. Ibid. 
10 The California Supreme Court justified its holding by reference to our 
conclusion in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U. S. 427 (1953), that arbitration agree-
ments are nonbinding as to claims arising under the federal Securities Act 
- of 1933. 31 Cal. 3d at 602, 645 P. 2d at 1202--1203. The analogy is unper-
suasive. The question in Wilko was not whether a state legislature could 
create an exception to § 2 of the Arbitration Act, but rather whether Con-
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class action arbitration and any other issues not raised in the 
California courts, no decision by this Court would be appro-
priate at this time. As to the latter issues, the case is re-
manded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this 
opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
CHAMBE:RS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H . RE.HNQUIST 
.lJnprtnU (lfgurt .n tlrt ~tb !'taU• 
.. u!png~ ~. <lf. 2ll,?~~ 
December 19, 1983 
Re: No. 82-500 Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Dear Chief: 
In this case I will await Sandra's dissent. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
82-~00 South nn~ ~or.p. v. Keatina 
'· 
D~ar Chi.ef: 
Please joi.n me. 
SincerPly, 
ThP ~hief Ju~ticP 
lfo/c::;s 
cc: T e Conference 
CI-!AMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REf:iNQUIST 
,ju.pr.mtt QJ!tnrlttf tltt ~tb .ilbm• 
._as!pnghm. J. QJ. 20hi~~ I 
December 20, 1983 
Re: No. 82-500 Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Dear Sandra: 
Please join me in your very convincing dissent. 
Sincerely, 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
~UJtttntt Qf&turl &rf tlrt ~tb ~tattS' 
~fringtltn. ~.<If. 20p'l.;J 
December 20, 1983 
Re: 82-500 -
Southland Corporation v. Keating 
Dear Chief, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
cpm 
CHAMBERS 01'" 
.JUSTICE w ... .J. BRENNAN, .JR. 
.iUFtmt Qtcurt cf tfrt ,-mttb .itaftg 
~as~~. (!}. 20.SJI.~ 
December 20, 1983 
No. 82-500 
Southland Corporation, e t al. 




The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~u;tr.tmt Qiourt of tqt ~b j)tafts 
'Dlasqmghnt. ~. <!f. 2.tl.;i'!~ 
December 22, 1983 
Re: No. 82-500-Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Dear Chief: 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.§u:p-rtutt <Q:onrl cf t4t ~ttitt~ ;§;mug 
1ltltlllyi:ttgtett. 19. <Q:. 2rl.;TJk~ ' 
December 30, 1983 
Re: No. 82-500 - Southland Corporation v. Keating 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
I thought that on January 10, 1983, we had postponed 
in this case, rather than ·· noting. If I am correct, the 
statement in the middle of p. 3 of your opinion perhaps 




The Chief Justice 
cc: The Conference 
i'upunu Clf&nttt Df ·tift ~niu~ iltatt.e-
JluJrittghtn, ~. Of. Zll.;i-"'~ 
CH .... BERS OF" 
.JUSTICE .JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January ~2, 1984 
Re: 82-500 - Southland Corp. v. Keating 
Dear Chief: 
My apologies for holding this case up but I still 
am not completely at rest. My views are closer to 
yours than to Sandra's, but I am still inclined to 
adhere to my dissenting vote which I will try to 
explain in just a few paragraphs. I am sure I will be 
finished early next week. 
Respectfully, 
J~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
&82-500 Southland v. Keating {Rob) 
CJ for the Court 10/7/83 
1st draft 12/17/83 
2nd draft 12/21/82 
3rd draft 1/5/84 
4th draft 1/19/84 
Joined by LFP 12/20/83 
Joined by BRW 12/20/83 
Joined by WJB 12/20/83 
Joined by TM 12/22/83 
Joined by HAB 12/30/83 
SOC dissent 12/19/83 
1st draft 12/19/83 
2nd draft 12/22/83 
Joined by WHR 12/20/83 
JPS will dissent 1/12/84 
JPS concurring in part & dissenting in part 
1st draft 1/18/84 
2nd draft 1/19/84 
